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I. Basic Issues in the Understanding of Law 
  
1. For an ontological reconstruction, the significance of juristische Weltan-
schauung as one of the original components of the law’s very existence (besides 
objectified embodiments) is definitely shown by the fact that institutionalised 
social existence, whatever it be, cannot but withstand those kinds of simplifi-
cation inspired by the Newtonian outlook of the universe (reducing reality to 
casual intertwinement of causal series originated by things and powers directed 
at them), in terms of which we may and have to differentiate the ‘construction’ 
itself (as given from the outset) from its ‘being made to function’ as a 
complementation exteriorly and posteriorly added to the former by an individual 
purposeful or random act; albeit when we are considering social dynamics with 
social institutions at work, we are tempted to take simplifyingly the two above 
components as some bifactoral mechanics that has been organised into one 
single functional system. As opposed to the physical world, however, in the 
specifically social world exclusively kinds of phenomena (features and aspects) 
suitable to be reconstrued from their actual movement as their genuine 
subsistence can be thought as prevailing as having the specific quality of 
‘social existence’.1 
 Consequently, the ontological status of the way the jurist approaches to law 
in a manner sanctioned by the approved canon of the profession–describing the 
kinds of intellectual operations he/she usually performs by referencing to the 
law and the actual ways in which real life situations are judged by justices in 
law (as if all it were a simple deduction from the law valid at the time)–is 
hardly more or else than what is called professional deontology. And this is 
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just not simply a case of false ideology (as usually treated by Marxisms) but a 
specific procedure of (virtual? real? in any case: actual) reality construction, 
controlled by the required mental referencing as a mediator wedged in-between.2 
As if the same background idea asserted in the professional conceptualisation 
of norms would also be repeated here as applied to the overall functioning of 
the normative world. For in the same way as neither the norm is descriptive–
therefore necessarily true/false–a ‘reflection’ (the fact notwithstanding that 
its lingual expression suggests as if it were exactly some description of 
ontological relations),3 nor this reality construction is effectuated–„caused”, or 
made to have no alternatives at all in practical decision making–by the norm 
(the fact notwithstanding that the normative understanding of norms pictures 
and officially justifies it as such).4 
 
2. The duality of ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ (which Roscoe Pound 
formulated originally as a pioneering category of legal sociology after he had 
realised that positivation itself cannot automatically be equated to textual 
effects referenced to in implementation) has turned into a genuine paradox 
when it has also been revealed that differing normative orders, heterogeneous 
to one another to an extent to be almost incommensurable by their textures 
compared, can nevertheless exert quite a commensurable impact as measured 
by the social effect to which, however, they may lead in societies at by and 
large comparable civilisational levels.5 
 Accordingly, one may raise the issue whether or not there may be a hidden 
(and hitherto unrecognised) “magic” (perhaps exerting influence on/through 
  
 2 Cf. Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1981. It is to 
be noted that ‘mediation’ [Vermittlung] itself is a key term of Georg Lukács’ posthumous 
Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. For a background, see Varga, Cs.: Marxian 
Legal Theory. Aldershot, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1993. 
 3 Cf. Varga, Cs.: A magatartási szabály és az objektív igazság kérdése [Rule of 
behaviour and the issue of objective truth] [1964], in his Útkeresés Kísérletek – kéziratban 
[Searching for a path Unpublished essays], Budapest, 2001, 4–18. 
 4 Cf., in summation of a decade’s research previously published in huge a many parts, 
Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts [1992], Budapest, 
1995. Later on, a similar conclusion was reached from the phenomenologisation of Critical 
Legal Studies by Conklin, W. A.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse The 
Judicial Production and the Disclosure of Suffering. Aldershot, 1998, preceded, as a case 
study, by his Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey of Semiotics and Phenome-
nology. Ottawa Law Review 27 (1995–1996) 129–173. 
 5 Zweigert, K.: Solutions identiques par des voies différentes (Quelques observations 
en matières de droit comparé). Revue internationale de Droit comparé 18 (1966) 5–18. 
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other–cultural?–paths) similarity (or some mechanism of effects resulting in 
comparable ends) among such linguistically differently expressed and culturally 
differently contextualised rules aiming at behavioural regulation and control, 
or the norm(s) posited by them can only qualify as a decisive factor of 
decision-making by their mere appearance and backing normative ideology 
solely, while in fact other (further) circumstances do play the role of 
determination in (parts or the over-weighty part of) the actual process.6 
 
3. The answer is to be searched for in the actual functioning of the ‘judicial 
mind’ taken as a ‘black-box’ (symbol for a self-regulating cybernetic entity), in 
case of which, its internal laws remaining unknown, we can only try at re-
constructing the regularities at work in it through the analysis of its actual data 
processing, by comparing what are their in-puts to what are their respective 
out-puts. 
 First of all, the judicial mind aims at resolving (by settling) the conflicts of 
prevailing interests (involving the axiological conflicts behind them) brought 
before court fora, through asserting that alternative of resolution (settlement) 
which it considers the most defendable of (while balancing amongst) all the 
feasible (or presented) variations–by fulfilling, inasmuch as available at an 
optimum level, the ‘system of fulfilment’ [Verfüllungssystem] canonised in the 
given legal regime–, all this being operated by the law’s particular technicality 
which, in each and every case in principle, makes it possible with equal logical 
chance (that is, in a way not any longer limitable or controllable by logic) to 
select those procedures from the stock of available (by the way, even logically 
mutually counter running) techniques,7 with the help of which one may argue 
for the given norm either covering or non-covering (and therefore either to be 
applied or disapplied to) the case at hand, and respectively, by the help of 
which–in the name of our common respect for the law–either strict or equitable 
judicial adjudication can be reached almost at please, when also the strictness 
of the wording of the law is loosened in cases when a programme “to make the 
law liveable” is appealed for. 
  
 6 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Theory and Practice in Law: On the Magical Role of Legal Technique. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 351–372 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
j4k2u58xk7rj6541/fulltext.pdf>. 
 7 For the foundational outlines, cf. Varga, Cs.–Szájer, J.: Legal Technique. In: Mock, 
E.–Varga, Cs. (eds.): Rechtskultur – Denkkultur. Ergebnisse des ungarisch-österreichischen 
Symposiums der Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 1987. 
Stuttgart, 1989, 136–147.  
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 Accordingly, behind the stage appearance and ideology of mere norm 
application there is always a human being at standing work, with own valuation 
and further full human(e)ly personal facultases mobilised when the determina-
tion is taken to (and how to) decide. For the hermeneutic definition of the very 
understanding of norms as a kind of cultural predisposition [Vorverständnis] 
will from the beginning have a selective effect on the judicial ascertainment of 
both those facts that shall constitute the given case (Tatbestand, taken as the 
legally exclusively relevant set of facts to be judged) and the norm to be 
applied thereto (including its actual meaning reflected to, by validated in, the 
given case). On the one hand and always posteriorly, the logic of justification 
cannot do but infer the decision from the given normative set by positing that 
there is an available cluster of norms from which the case-specific and case-
conform selection has been made and, on its turn, the selected norm will have 
already defined what fact(s) can be taken as relevant for the actual norm 
application. On the other hand, however, from the point of view of the logic of 
problem-solving (that is, the genuine logic at work in the actual process), any 
consideration of either facts or norms can at all be marshalled in simultaneous 
mutuality of both sides as complementarily reflected upon and through (as 
tested by) one another. 
 This is why for an ontological reconstruction of the judicial process, the 
judicial operation with both legal provisions and so called facts can only be 
termed as manipulation. On its behalf and as the temporary end product of 
judicial reality construction, this manipulation will produce so-called case-
law, on the one hand, and law-case, on the other. The former represents law as 
actualised to a concrete life situation, while the latter stands for the legal 
reconstruction of real life facts that will then be adjudicated in law. It is to be 
seen that the exclusive reason and the genuine roots of both sides lies in their 
having been mutually reflected–the fact notwithstanding that the official court 
statement is to build on the hypothesis (taken as an ideological claim) of their 
being independently posited and then related to one another. 
 
4. In sum, the law can not simply be reduced to rule components alone.8 What 
is more, similarities and dissimilarities amongst legal arrangements can not even 
be reduced to rule contextures termed as mentalités juridiques either (using a 
notion applied until now exclusively to the self-conflicting contemporary 
  
 8 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Is Law A System of Enactments? In: Peczenik, A.–Lindahl, L.–
Roermund, B.: Theory of Legal Science. Dordrecht–Boston–Lancaster, 1984, 176. 
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European legal set-up, composed of Civil Law and Common Law regimes9).10 
The realisation of differing legal mentalities lurking behind in the background 
is part of a larger problem indeed that can only be revealed, I believe, by future 
inquiries into what I propose to call ‘Comparative Judicial Mind’ within the 
larger domain of future analyses on the field what I do mean by ‘Comparative 
Legal Cultures’.11 
 Unfolding what is inherently working within the judicial ‘black-box’ promises 
an answer to the query raised in the former paragraphs, namely, whether or not 
the law as the total sum of enactments is either one of the (probably determi-
native) relatively autonomous components of the complex legal network aiming 
at the regulation and effective control of behaviours or, simply, one of the 
(probably determinative) signals of cultural expectations formulated in many 
ways in the complex social patterning network taken in the largest sense, a 
total sum that can neither stand for nor substitute to the total complex of social 
patterning (which is to enclose into one framework both cultural determination 
and the entire process of getting determined in interaction). 
 Concludingly, the comparative analysis of the judicial ‘black-box’ is faced 
with a double task: on the one hand–as motivated by pure theoretical interest–, 
it recourses to historical “legal mapping”, that is, to draw the available 
taxonomy of all the variety of past and present legal experiences of theatrum 
legale mundi in representation of the whole arena of our historical and cultural 
diversity,12 and on the other hand–for the sake of assuring mutual cognition on 
behalf of all concerned and out of purely practical interest–, it is to promote 
interaction amongst differing civilisational superstructures, with approaches, 
conceptual sets and institutions, human sensitivities and professional skills 
included, for widening their horizons in a continued learning process. 
  
 9 For the expression, and its unfolding as a key term, cf. Legrand, P.: Le droit 
comparé. Paris, 1999, 127, and his Fragments on Law-as-Culture. Deventer, 1999.  
 10 For their internal variety and richness with a partly heterogeneous historico-cultural 
potential, cf. Gessner, V.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs. (eds.): European Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot–Brookfield USA–Singapore–Sydney, 1996.  
 11 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Comparative Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine 
Discipline. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 95–113 and <http://akademiai.om.hu/ 
content/gk485p7w8q5652x3/fulltext.pdf>. 
 12 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Introduction to Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot–Hong Kong–Singapore–Sydney–New York, 1992, and, more developed, his 
Theatrum legale mundi avagy a jogrendszerek osztályozása [On the Classification of Legal 
Systems]. In: Szilágyi, H. I.–Paksy, M. (eds.): Ius unum, lex multiplex. Liber Amicorum: 
Studia Z. Péteri dedicata (Studies in Comparative Law, Theory of State and Legal 
Philosophy). Budapest, 2005, 219–242 and 243–244. 
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5. Up to the point reached here, our developments have been grounded on the 
widely held assumption of classical legal positivism as the approach to law 
traditionalised in the western civilisation.13 However, our inquiry must diversify 
into further paths of research and extended cores of problematisation, taking 
also into account the materialisation of the law’s own (so called) post modern 
conditions under which the new juristische Weltanschauung itself will declare 
(or simply tolerate the hard empirical facts of) the re/dis-solution of legal 
positivism (taken narrow-mindedly as rule-positivism) in a legal regime that 
asserts itself as thoroughly (α) constitutionalised while also (β) multiculturally 
(γ) poly-centered under conditions when (δ) even its eventual codification 
cannot aim at more than just foreseeing patterns to be considered (δ/1) at the 
level of principles (δ/2) as the suggestion of the temporarily best solutions 
(that may be changed the next time), which (δ/3) openly calls for continuous 
judicial unfolding and further development (refinement and adaptation); or, 
summarily expressed, (ε) the final re/dis-solution of classical legal positivism 
in what adepts now call ‘legal socio-positivism’ [socio-positivisme juridique].14 
Well, the ERC advanced research proposed has also to involve the foresight in 
what way and how such a new setting (with further ongoing moves also 
considered) will have a detouring accumulated impact on the tasks judicial 
law-actualisation is going to face in actual court processes. 
 A further complementary issue and topic of problematisation is set by the 
renewing international arena as well. This is dedicated partly to those forms 
that the above re/dis-solution may have on the field of international law 
proper15 and partly to forms that the structural arrangement and internal 
  
 13 As mirrored by the development of the idea of law-codification and the adventure of 
its variegated uses and attempts at implementation, cf. Varga, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-
historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991. 
 14 Cf. Varga, Cs.: What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates 
Revolving around the Topic of “The Judicial Establishment of Facts”. In: Atienza, M.– 
Pattaro, E.–Schulte, M.–Topornin, B.–Wyduckel, D. (eds.): Theorie des Rechts und der 
Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657–676 
as well as his Meeting Points between the Traditions of English–American Common Law 
and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments and Experience of Postmodernity in 
Canada), Acta Juridica Hungarica 44 (2003) 21–44 and <http://www.akademiai.com/ 
content/x39m7w437134167l/fulltext.pdf>. 
 15 According to Koskenniemi, M.: The Politics of International Law. European Journal 
of International Law 1 (1990) 4–32, „Social theorists have documented a recent modern 
turn in national societies away from the Rechtsstaat into a society in which social conflict 
is increasingly met with flexible, contextually determined standards and compromises. The 
turn away from general principles and formal rules into contextually determined equity 
may reflect a similar turn in the development of international legal thought and practice. 
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organisation of international humanitarian law will probably establish when it 
is about to reach its relative completion. For, as known, its novel structuration 
is based growingly on the call for a mode of thinking asserting definite (well-
circumscribed) value-preferences in military/civil strategic/tactic planning and 
execution, rather than on traditional schemes of mere issuing rules of 
behaviour, a regulatory model historically practiced hitherto in law. Well, the 
query focuses here on what repercussions this new method of patterning may 
and probably will have as regards to the development of domestic laws and the 
diversification of the latter’s instruments. 
 
6. It can be taken for granted that so long as it is not cleared adequately and to 
the sufficient depth what law in social existence truly is (that is, what indeed 
makes it suitable to exert normative effects in the realms of both the Ought/Sollen 
and the Is/Sein as well),16 certainly we shall not be in a position to control its 
conscious planning and shaping, that is, its overall destiny. Until it we cannot 
help entertaining ourselves in re of law if not in a merely symbolical sense and 
with a sheerly metaphorical force, i.e., in the exclusive manner of signalling 
something as referring to it at the most.17 When in everyday professional 
                                                      
There is every reason to take this turn seriously–though this may mean that lawyers have to 
re-think their professional self-image. For issues of contextual justice cannot be solved by 
the application of ready-made rules or principles. Their solution requires venturing into 
fields such as politics, social and economic casuistry which were formally delimited 
beyond the point at which legal argument was supposed to stop in order to remain »legal«. 
To be sure, we shall remain uncertain. Resolutions based on political acceptability cannot 
be made with the kind of certainty post-Enlightenment lawyers once hoped to attain. And 
yet, it is only by their remaining so which will prevent their use as apologies for tyranny.” 
 16 In the context of Georg Lukács Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins 
(Prolegomena, MS in Lukács Archives M/153, p. 253), it is of a criterial importance that 
“social being” as such can only emerge once the phenomenon in question starts actually 
exerting specific effects [e.g., „Das Sein besteht aus unendlichen Wechselbeziehungen 
prozessierender Komplexe”]. 
 17 As already demonstrated by the author–Lectures on the Paradigms… op. cit., 
passim–, in addition to the ways in which the law shall be treated and applied (as something 
ready-made), also–as a prior issue–the ways by which the law can be produced (e.g., 
which procedure can result in a law made, fed from what and attaining what degree of 
completion) are getting conventionalised by the ideology of the legal profession. For we could 
take it as previously given from our inquiries into the methodology of the formation of legal 
notions–Varga, Cs.: Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des concepts en 
sciences juridiques in Archives de Philosophie du Droit 16 (1973) 205–241–and into the 
law’s anthropological foundations–Varga, Cs.: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold 
Pospíšil and the Comparative Study of Legal Cultures in Law in East and West. Tokyo, 
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routine we act as jurists, usually we identify what we mean by the law through 
its eventually objectified phenomenal forms, that is, through the latter’s 
procedurally due formal enactment, its textual wording, as carrier of what we 
qualify by legal validity;18 although when we act as jurisprudents we are aware 
of the underlying fact that this is but a simplifyingly abbreviated expression, 
and no criteria set by actually canonised states of an ideology (upheld 
temporarily by the legal profession) is entitled to substitute to scientific 
description and definition. This is why the subject and main vocation of our 
present interest in the recent research topic is to circumscribe, as exactly as 
possible, those necessarily fragmentarily objectified items (composing parts) of 
the law (necessarily withstanding, of course, definitions pointing beyond the 
limitingly relativising terms of “in this or that sense” and “more or less”, 
because the law stuff, lingually expressed, is the same for law enacted, law 
enforced, law doctrinally treated in so called Rechtsdogmatik, as well as for law 
as the scientific object of study), together with those entire social, institutional, 
and intellectually represented environments of law that, on the final analysis 
and at any given time, will in their totality create and make up as well as form 
and shape the law. 
 
7. In want of a deepened answer to the above, it is by far not unambiguous 
what we exactly desire for when, for instance, we announce our strive for the 
harmonisation of laws within the European Union (unifying them by common 
codification, among others),19 or when, responding to the challenges made 
                                                      
1988, 265–285 and his ‘Law’, or ‘More or Less Legal?’ Acta Juridica Hungarica 34 (1992) 
139–146–that independently of the self-definition and self-provision of the law, there is a 
constant battle for both its everyday uses and tendential definition ongoing among at least 
three of its feasible components in mutual rivalry: positing as law / enforcing as law / 
popular practicing as law. Accordingly, instead of ‘law’ in general, we can only speak 
about law with further specification implied, that is, as circumscribing it in and against a 
multifactoral continuous move. Or, on final analysis, the question of ‘what the law is’ is 
changed by the sole issue in which sense the law is properly and actually meant; whether 
anything meant is meant so either more or less; and if it is meant so at all, then in which 
phase of either developing to become, or ceasing to have been, a law. 
 18 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Validity. Acta Juridica Hungarica 41 (2000) 155–166 and 
<http://springer.om.hu/content/mk0r8mu315574066/fulltext.pdf>. 
 19 Cf. Varga, Cs.: La Codification à l’aube du troisième millénaire in: Cohen-Jonathan, 
G.–Gaudemet, Y.–Hertzog, R.–Wachsmann, P.–Waline, J. (eds.): Mélanges Paul Amselek. 
Bruxelles, 2004, 779–800 and his Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 89–117 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
cv56l91505t7k36q/fulltext.pdf>, as well as Az Európai Unió közös joga: Jogharmonizálás és 
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explicit by the globalisation process ongoing in our days, we declare our longing 
for a substantiated respect for ‘the rule of law’ and ‘legality’, both in the further 
shaping of international law and especially within the decision making processes 
of international organisations (such as the United Nations).20 For nowadays 
more than dreams are at stake on this global terrain. Firm determination is 
almost reached for that upon the model offered domestically by constitutional 
courts, some legal/juristic filtering agent should and shall indeed be built in 
at/around the peaks of such big international organisations (amongst which 
mostly the United Nations Organisation Security Council is specified by the 
literature), with a clear intent to control and possibly also efficaciously sanction 
the conformity of the course they are actually taking with the ideal of what is 
now called ‘the international rule of law’, even if it is by far not thoroughly 
and reassuringly clarified what is meant exactly thereby and how it can be 
measured within a multi-partnership complex network operated by various 
sides and under ever-changing conditions. 
 
 
II. Questions to be Raised by Legal Arrangements Individually 
 
8. All these developments precondition to clarify the (simultaneously condi-
tioning and conditional) basic issue in what law does indeed subsist. 
 The overall query for identifying what on final analysis law consists of and 
what it is building constantly from can only be detected from its actual 
operation, that is, from the moves by which it is operated and made to function, 
otherwise speaking, from its practical working (including the ways by which it 
recurrently reconventionalises its standing or innovative routine), or, in sum, 
from the analysis of intellectual/mental operations actually effected on/by (while 
appeals and/or references are getting made to) the law. For reaching adequate 
                                                      
jogkodifikáció [The common law of the European Union: Harmonisation and codification]. 
Iustum Aequum Salutare 4 (2008) 131–150 and 283. 
 20 Cf., e.g., Bryde, B.-O.: Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationa-
lisierung des Verfassungsrechts. Der Staat 42 (2003) 1, 61 et seq. and, for the background, 
Goldstein, J. et al. (ed.): Legalization and World Politics. Cambridge, Ma., 2001, and 
Pildes, R. H.: Conflicts between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of 
Legalism. Virginia Journal of International Law 44 (2002), 145 et seq. For an overview, 
see also by the author ‘Jogi kultúránk – európai és globális távlatban’ [Our legal culture 
from a European and global perspective] in: Paksy, M. (ed.): Európai jog és jogfilozófia. 
Tanulmányok az európai integráció ötvenedik évfordulójának ünnepére [European law and 
philosophy of law: Papers dedicated to the half-of-the-century of European integration]. 
Budapest, 2008, 13–42, particularly para. 5: “The rule of law”, 25 et seq. 
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knowledge, we have to reconstruct exactly what it is that on final account gets 
referred to as the law, and indeed, what is the relationship reconstruable 
through such analyses between its aspect (property, feature, etc.) referred to as 
‘the law’ and the practical conclusion inferred (stated, motivated, and justified 
mostly by justices) as ‘the conclusion of the law’. 
 
9. Triple sorts of questions can be formulated here as queries to be addressed 
to all legal traditions and arrangements that can at all be included in such an 
inquiry: whether or not (1) their law is exhaustively embodied by their given 
textual corpuses, or those texts, destined only to offer from what to learn the 
law, are mere signals as exemplifications from the law, or references to realise 
how rich the potential hidden in the entire stuff of the law is, or not more 
ambitious then serving as memo-props or didactic help on desirable or mostly 
followed practices in the name of the law; whether or not (2) in the medium 
carrying or lingually manifesting it, the law is also conceptualised, that is, its 
words used are at the same time defined as systemic and taxonomic locuses 
of a notional network built at varying (adequate) levels of generality with the 
claim of exhaustive completeness, or all these are, in want of better, 
linguistically exhibited for the exclusive sake of making communication 
possible at all on law, with kinds of mere naming that only characterise, instead 
of any classification performed within some relatively closed and internally 
arranged taxonomy; and lastly, whether or not (3) in the intellectual opera-
tional series targeting that the mutual reflection of the law and the facts 
constituting the case of it will be achieved in the case at hand, the claim is 
formulated and enforced for the legal decision being derived from the law as a 
logical conclusion of it (parallel to the requirement for its categorically formal 
and exhaustive posterior justification excluding any alternative to the 
decision reached), or logic can only and will in fact remain in the background 
all through, playing, if at all, some merely controlling function at the most.21 
  
 21 For some basic hints, cf. Varga, Cs.: Jogdogmatika, avagy jus, jurisprudentia és 
társai – tudományelméleti nézőpontból [Rechtsdogmatik, or jus and jurisprudentia in the 
perspective of the theory of science] and ‘Jog’, ‘jogtudomány’, ‘tudomány’ – lét- és ismeret-
elméleti nézőpontból (Viszontválasz) [Law, science of law, and science, in an ontological 
and epistemological perspective] and A dogmatika természetét illető kutatások lehetséges 
hozadéka (Hozzászólás) [The possible fruits of inquiries into the nature of dogmatics]. 
In: Szabó, M. (ed.): Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet. A Miskolci Egyetem és a Miskolci 
Akadémiai Bizottság által 2006. november 10-én és 11-én rendezett konferencia anyaga 
[Legal dogmatics and legal theory: Conference proceedings]. Miskolc, 2007, 11–26, 68–80 
and 245–251, as well as his Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics). Acta 
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10.  This inquiry can be assured by investigating applied legal techniques in 
quadruple directions that may have developed in each and every legal system 
to a locally sufficient degree, that is, techniques which, on the one hand, (a) 
have to guarantee the need of any given law and order to remain stable and 
preserved in its identity through the continued flow of challenges it is faced to 
answer in the meantime all along, (b–c) have to produce instrumentalities 
available as suitable for that change, adaptation, or mere refinement as needed 
at any time can be effectuated, and which, on the other hand, (d) can close 
down the mutual reflection of rules and facts by/upon one another in a way 
excluding any doubt–mostly by the mere fact (or authority) of the decision 
taken or the self-comforting cover of its alleged logical certainty. 
 In accordance with the above, (a) the first of the directions relating to applied 
legal technicalities moves (by oscillating) between the (frequently simultaneous) 
opposites of conservatio/novatio, with the recourse to which partial renewal 
may of course be achieved by interpretation but in most of the cases only 
fragmentarily at a given time, as emphatically counterbalanced by the simulta-
neous conservation of all the other terrains and domains of regulation for a 
while; (b) the second of the directions (sometimes in parallel to the former) 
moves (by oscillating) between what is considered ius strictum / ius aequum in 
the given moment of the ever-developing overall regulatory arrangement, 
which move (somewhat modelling the former) may venture either to loosen the 
original (or derivative) strictness of the regulation in question (mostly in its 
practical legal consequence) or, vice versa, to fix the original (or derivative) 
equity available in the actual regulation, in each case preserving the prevailing 
state of strictness/equity of all the other fields; (c) a two-way option almost 
depending on free choice as an evergreen instrumental trouvaille of legal 
technicality can also be realised by the continuing tension between moves 
targeting generalisatio/exceptio, in case of which conservation/novation and/or 
strictness/loosening are/is either generalised or made to become an exception 
(whilst we have to be aware of the fact that, logically from the outset, any 
change as compared to the original state makes it an exception). Finally, (d) for 
that the law’s abstract normative expectations can be related–projected, then 
ascribed–to actual facts by performing a formal synthesis22 unifying the 
                                                      
Juridica Hungarica 49 (2008) 253–274 and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/g352w44h 
21258427/fulltext.pdf>. 
 22 This is what a Hungarian classic of legal sociology once termed as synopsis for his 
processual theorising. Cf. Varga, Cs. (ed.): Horváth, B.: The Bases of Law / A jog alapjai 
[1948]. Budapest, 2006. Cf. also Jakab, A.: Neukantianismus in der ungarischen Rechts-
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heterogeneities of Ought and Is in the court’s dictum normatively judging upon 
sheer facts, an artificially formalised gesture is also required (reminding of the 
otherwise a-natural effects of, say, mancipatio in Roman law, activated–as an 
institutional act with normative effects–by an easily memorisable formal human 
gesture as the sine qua non complementation eventually performing it in law), 
by means of which in order to officially ascertain equalisibility (reflectability and 
ascribibility, or correspondence or similarity) between the two sides, depending 
on the logical transcription of their connection established, either logified sub-
sumption [subsumptio] or discretionally decided subordination [subordinatio] 
will finally be declared by mobilising all the available and freely disposable 
legal techniques for its demonstration [justificatio / motivatio]. 
 (It is to be noted that the classical stock of legal technicalities have to be 
expanded so as to include, for instance,23 techniques of argumentation by basic 
principles and of the constitutionalisation of issues, as well as the recourse to 
filling gaps in the law or the case-specific determination of the meaning of so-
called flexible or uncertain terms in law.) 
 
 
III. The Circle of Legal Arrangements to be Included in the Investigation 
 
11.  The investigation revolving around the judicial ‘black-box’ is to concentrate 
(1) on Civil Law and Common Law arrangements, decisive for foreseeing the 
prospects of their future dis/con-vergence what is at stake when we aim at the 
eventual unification of laws within the European Union, by surveying also, on 
the one hand, (1/a) their antecedents, involving the kinds of legal reasoning 
characteristic of the ancient Greeks and Romans (differentiated amongst them-
selves according to relevant periods) and, on the other, (1/b) their historical 
formation within/into own so called families or groups–separately in the 
(1/b/α) Latin and Germanic, as well as the (1/b/β) Nordic stuffs–, enlarged up 
to include (1/c) their mixed/mixing branching(s) off in the world (exemplified 
primarily by Scotland, Québec, Louisiana, and the State of Israel) as well. This 
has to be complemented by the other part of the diversity of world civilisations, 
namely, by (2) what can be learned about the resolution/settlement of legal 
conflicts in autochthonous societies, as probably our common civilisational 
root culture (with the data of contemporary legal anthropological researches 
and tribal materials included), as well as, nearing the specifically European 
                                                      
theorie in der ersten Hälfte des XX. Jahrhunderts. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
94 (2008) 264–272. 
 23 Cf. with para. 5 above. 
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roots, (3) the classical Jewish and Arabic traditions, contrasted–for signalling 
the availably practiced variety of patterns–with at least (4) the Asian tradition 
exemplified by the Korean, Chinese and Japanese procedures and lastly, as 
annexed by–in function of the availability of data and monographic treatments–, 
for instance, (5) the Persian, Indian, or other tradition(s). 
 
IV. Purpose and Impact of Investigations 
 
12.  The research hypothesis itself is addressing important challenges at the 
frontiers of the field addressed by its being grounded on assumptions going 
substantially beyond the current mainstream state of the art. Its underlying 
approach to law through the reinterpreted duality of “law in books” and “law 
in action” between which the judicial ‘black-box’ (calling for unfolding in the 
present project) can only erect a bridge by opening up quite new horizons, 
once it is also recognised that the very fact of (alongside the manner in which) 
exerting social influence constitutes–serving as the basis for–the ontological 
existence of law. Thereby features of law in practice perceived mostly as either 
contingently added moments or mere accidents of false consciousness (and 
therefore treated, if at all, epistemologically) are elevated into the unified 
domain of the law’s very ontology. In parallel with the distinction of the logic 
of problem solving from the one of formal justification, the very notion of 
legal technique and its usual assessment as mere accompaniment in instrumental 
complementation is changed to an unconventionally novel one, with a creative 
or arbitrative potential able to marshal the process up to its outcome.24 By 
launching a research to be carried on ‘the comparative judicial mind’, the 
concept of “legal mentalities” itself (quite à la mode now and excellently useful 
in prophesising on the con-/dis-verging prospects of Civil Law and Common 
Law in the European Union) is transubstantiated into a transdisciplinary notion 
that can only be described by a long series of multidisciplinary investigations. 
 Such features of law as its exhaustive embodiment in textures, conceptualisa-
tion perfected, or thorough logification, have never been systematically surveyed 
through historico-comparative inquiries. Moreover, neither themselves indeed 
nor their varieties in various legal-cultural settings have been notionalised as 
  
 24 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 
1995 and his What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around 
the Topic of “The Judicial Establishment of Facts”. In: Atienza, M.–Pattaro, E.–Schulte, 
M.–Topornin, B.–Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift 
für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657–676. 
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yet. What I call post modern challenges of and by the law25 is well cultivated in 
literature but without having been generalised as parts (or the over-weighty 
superior part) in any overall Juristische Methodenlehre (or juristic meth-
odology). And almost the same holds for international law, for neither 
humanitarian methodology nor post positivism’s challenge to international 
regulation has ever been subjected to legal philosophical reflection, generali-
sation and application up to now. 
 European endeavours at unifying/codifying/harmonising member states’ 
laws are mostly politically expressed and sectorally advanced in travaux fore- 
préparatoires rather than envisaged in all their possible actual implementa-
tions, including their feasible legal-philosophical dimensions. As a matter of due 
course, ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘international rule of law’ have only simply been 
mostly used as key words without whatever theoretical-methodological 
scrutiny done to the depth, what the present paper proposes to achieve. 
Accordingly, the conceptualisation itself it is bound to conclude by has to be 
unconventionally novel. 
 Or, the impact will be (1) a more differentiatedly complex notion of law in 
which both the classical positivist and the post positivist stands are transcended 
by a concept based upon something operated rather than merely positivated; 
(2) a theatrum legale mundi with a thorough historico-comparative overview 
of the kinds of judicial mind actively working in all its representative varieties, 
past and present; and (3) a legal-philosophical substantiation of (3a) what can 
at all be meant (3aα) by the “rule of law” and “international rule of law” and 
also (3aβ) by unification, codification and harmonisation of laws, especially in a 
European Union context; as well as (3b) what impact so called post modern 
conditions of law expressed by the constitutionalisation of issues and the 
argumentation by principles may have on the future of judicial adjudication in 
view of the self-strengthening re-/dis-solution of classical rule-positivism; 
(3cα) what impact the specific methodology of international humanitarian law 
may have on other fields of law, including the issue of (3cβ) what impact post 
modern novelties and humanitarian specificities may have on the 
understanding and individual identifiability of what is meant exactly by the 
“rule of law” and “international rule of law”.26 
 
  
 25 Para. 5 above. 
 26 A proposal prepared under–and within the finances of–the Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund (OTKA) project K62382. 
